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Casinos operate by generating sequences of outcomes which appear unpredictable, or
random, to effective gamblers. We investigate relative notions of randomness for gamblers
whose wagers are restricted to a ﬁnite set. Some sequences which appear unpredictable
to gamblers using wager amounts in one set permit unbounded proﬁts for gamblers using
different wager values. In particular, we show that for non-empty ﬁnite sets A and B , every
A-valued random is B-valued random if and only if there exists a k 0 such that B ⊆ A ·k.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
You enter a casino and there is an “idiot” betting on a sequence of coin ﬂips with wagers of the following values: $2, $3,
and $7. He always bets on heads and cycles through these values:
$2,$3,$7,$2,$3,$7, . . .
You get a “normal” stack of values: $1, $5, and $10 with which to bet. The idiot becomes rich and moves to Beverly Hills,
and you move into a cardboard box. What happened?
Most casinos extract money from gamblers by exploiting the law of large numbers from probability theory which says that
almost surely the number of heads approaches one half the total coin ﬂips in the limit. The title of “probability-free” casino
indicates that we examine an alternate principle under which a casino might operate proﬁtably. In our paradigm, a naïve
“idiot,” as in the example above, seduces the gambler into believing he can duplicate the idiot’s sure win. Our main result
identiﬁes a sequence in which betting with wager values from one set one can gain arbitrary wealth whereas gambling
using another set of wager values results in guaranteed bankruptcy.
A sequence is a denumerable list of coin ﬂip outcomes, with “h” for heads and “t” for tails. In the following discussion,
{h,t}∗ denotes all ﬁnite strings of coin ﬂips, and {h,t}ω is the class of inﬁnite sequences of coin ﬂips. A computable
function M from {h,t}∗ to non-negative reals which satisﬁes the fairness condition
M(σ ) = M(σh) + M(σt)
2
for all σ ∈ {h,t}∗ is called a martingale [1]. Informally, a martingale is a gambling strategy, and the M represents the
gambler’s capital at each position.
For any sequence X ∈ {h,t}ω , X  n denotes the ﬁrst n coin ﬂips of X , and | · | denotes the length of a string, size of
a set, or absolute value of a real number. A martingale M succeeds on X ∈ {h,t}ω if M achieves arbitrarily large sums of
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A. Chalcraft et al. / Information and Computation 211 (2012) 160–164 161money over X , that is, limsupn M(X  n) = ∞.2 Otherwise X defeats M . For a martingale M and σ ∈ {h,t}∗ , M(σh)− M(σ )
is called the wager at σ . If the wager at σ is positive, then M predicts “heads” at σ ; if the wager at σ is negative, then M
predicts “tails” at σ .
Given a set V of reals, we say that a martingale is V -valued if for all σ the wager of M at σ belongs to V , unless M
does not have enough capital in which case the wager at σ is 0.
Deﬁnition. (See Bienvenu, Stephan, Teutsch [2].) A sequence X ∈ {h,t}ω is V -valued random if no V -valued martingale
succeeds on X .
For A ⊆ R, let A · k denote the set {x · k: x ∈ A}. The purpose of this article is to prove the following theorem which
answers a question posed by Bienvenu, Stephan, and Teutsch [2].
Theorem. Let A and B be non-empty ﬁnite sets of computable real numbers. Then every A-valued random is B-valued random if and
only if there exists a k 0 such that B ⊆ A · k.
Proof. Assume that B ⊆ A · k for some k  0, and suppose some B-valued martingale S succeeds on a sequence X . Let M
be a martingale which bets k times whatever S bets at each position (and starts with k times S ’s capital). Then M ’s capital
equals k times S ’s capital everywhere, so M succeeds on X .
Conversely, suppose that there is no k such that B ⊆ A · k. We shall exhibit a B-valued martingale S and a sequence
X such that S succeeds on X but no A-valued martingale succeeds on X . The martingale S represents the capital of a
stooge who works in collusion with the casino X . M0,M1,M2, . . . is a list of the A-valued martingales, or customers, who
bet on the casino’s coin ﬂips alongside the stooge. We shall build our casino so as to destroy all customers while allowing
the stooge to win arbitrarily large amounts of money. Our casino sequence will be non-computable since its construction
depends on access to a list of all A-valued martingales.
The overall heuristic is that each customer must try to copy the bets of the casino’s stooge, otherwise the casino can
just outright destroy the customer while simultaneously helping the stooge to win. But by the hypothesis that B  A · k,
no customer can exactly copy the stooge’s bets over an interval of positions containing all possible wagers for the stooge.
In particular, any customer must overbet or underbet somewhere along this interval, and then the casino can exploit the
customer’s misstep.
Assume B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bn}. We ﬁx S ’s strategy now so as to be independent of the choice of X :
S(σh) = S(σ ) + bi where |σ | ≡ i mod n,
unless S(σ ) < |bi | in which case S(σh) = S(σ ). In other words, S simply cycles through all possible wager values in B . The
initial capital of S is chosen to be at least maxi |bi |.
It suﬃces to build X so as to meet for all e the following requirements:
Re: Ruin Me (or reach a stage where Me stops betting).
Se: The stooge’s capital reaches $e at some position.
If all requirements are satisﬁed, then all Me ’s are obliterated and S succeeds. Our method for satisfying these requirements
is based on the following heuristics:
• Me always tries to “copy” S ’s bets. Otherwise X can hurt Me without harming S ’s capital.
• Once S is suﬃciently richer than Me , X just hurts both of them until Me dies.
The order of priority for satisfying the requirements above is:
S0 > R0 > S1 > R1 > S2 > R2 > · · · .
Higher priority requirements may injure lower priority Re requirements that have already been satisﬁed, but any particular
requirement will only be injured ﬁnitely often.
Basic module for Re . Our method to defeat a single customer is as follows. We build ﬁnite extensions whose limit is X . We
shall assume that at the current position the customer and the stooge always both bet on heads (or both bet on tails), since
the strategy for the casino is otherwise straightforward: help the stooge while hurting the customer.
2 Equivalently limn M(X  n) = ∞ since we only consider martingales whose non-zero wagers are bounded by some  > 0. If some martingale succeeded
limsup but not lim, then there is some least interval [k, (k+ 1)), k a non-negative integer, which the martingale’s capital visits inﬁnitely often, and after
all but ﬁnitely many such visits the next positive wager of the martingale must be correct. Thus some other martingale can succeed lim by agreeing with
the successful limsup martingale at these positions of minimal capital.
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times the magnitude of the customer’s wager exceeds the magnitude of the stooge’s wager, we choose a value for X which
hurts both the customer and stooge, and otherwise we help them both.
Intuitively, the casino hurts the customer if he bets riskier than the stooge; otherwise the casino helps the stooge get
ahead. By assumption the customer cannot match any multiple of the stooge’s |B| wager values, hence |B| consecutive
positions will suﬃce to commit a slight increase in the ratio of stooge-to-customer capital.
We shall show that the sequence of k’s is strictly increasing and tends to inﬁnity, at least until the customer runs out of
money. The latter condition must eventually occur because, due to the assumption that wagers are restricted to a ﬁnite set
of values, for suﬃciently large k the casino always hurts the customer.
We now give the full construction. Assume that X has been deﬁned at all positions less than p. We describe how to
make the next proper extension of X . Let e be the least index such that either:
1. S ’s capital has not reached $e at any position before p, or
2. Me makes a non-zero wager at position p.
If e satisﬁes the ﬁrst case, then we set X to agree with S ’s wager at position p, and we say that requirement Se acts at this
position. Otherwise Me made a non-zero wager at position p, and we say that e is the index which receives attention for the
next |B| positions (unless some higher priority requirement interrupts). In this case, we try to satisfy Re .
In order to ensure that the ratio of capitals between S and Me looks no less favorable to S than the last time Me made
a non-zero wager, we introduce the following function3:
e-savings(X  p) = max
u<p
{
S(X  u + 1): (∃ j < e)
[u was the latest position < p for which M j made a non-zero wager on X  u]
} ∪ {0}.
For each index j with priority higher than e, we look at the position of the most recent bet of M j and deﬁne e-savings
to be the maximum capital of the stooge over all such positions. The casino will prevent the stooge’s capital from ever
dropping below e-savings so long as R j does not force this to happen for some j < e. The idea is that no requirement
with priority less than Re can harm X ’s progress in defeating Me . Now deﬁne the ratio:
k(p) = S(X  p) − e-savings(X  p)
Me(X  p)
.




|S ’s wager at X  u|
|Me ’s wager at X  u|
]
.
P (u) holds when Me commits a greater fraction of capital (relative to position p) than S does.
We now enter a loop which lasts for up to |B| positions. We deﬁne p according to the loop, and then successively
p + 1, p + 2, . . . , p + |B| − 1 in the same way unless for some j < e the martingale M j makes a non-zero wager at one of
these positions. In this case, the loop breaks and instead j receives attention: we deﬁne a new function k and predicate
P based on j and the current position and initiate another length |B| loop analogously. Eventually one of these loops will
complete |B| repetitions, and at this point we will have deﬁned our next extension of X . For the remainder of the algorithm
description, we shall assume that the loop below lasts for the full |B| repetitions.
Assume that X has been deﬁned for all positions less than u. Now deﬁne X(u) according to the ﬁrst of the following
cases which is satisﬁed:
X(u) =
{ S ’s prediction at u if Me bets opposite from S at u or Me bets 0,
¬Me ’s prediction at u if P (u) holds,
Me ’s prediction at u if P (u) fails,
(1)
so that Me gets hurt iff she wagers a greater percentage of capital than S (and matches S ’s prediction) or makes the
opposite prediction of S . This completes the construction of X .
We now verify that X defeats every A-valued martingale. At every position u at which Me receives attention and
k(p) >
max{|b|: b ∈ B}
min{|a|: a ∈ A} , (2)
Me must lose money by (1). Thus it suﬃces to show that k(p) exceeds this bound (2) for all suﬃciently large p.
3 For the ﬁrst reading of this proof, consider the simpliﬁed problem where we diagonalize against only a single strategy M0. In this case we can just take
e-savings to be the constant zero function.
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repetitions. That is, we assume no higher priority requirement receives attention during these n steps. Let s1, s2, . . . , sn be
the dollars won (possibly negative) by S at positions p, p + 1, . . . , p + n − 1, and let m1,m2, . . . ,mn be the dollars won
by Me at these positions. Let q be the next position at which Me receives attention. For clarity in the calculation (3), let
s = s1 + s2 + · · · + sn and m =m1 +m2 + · · · +mn . If we further assume that p is suﬃciently large that after position p no
index less than e receives attention and no S j with j < e ever acts, then e-savings does not change between p and q and
thus
k(q) · [Me(X  p) +m]= [S(X  p) − e-savings(X  p)]+ s
= k(p) · Me(X  p) + s
= [k(p) · Me(X  p) + k(p) ·m]+ [−k(p) ·m + s],
and so
k(q) = k(p) + −k(p) ·m + s
Me(X  p) +m . (3)
Let c = |B| ·max{|a|: a ∈ A}. Then
Me(X  p) +m Me(X  p) + c. (4)
In particular, the denominator in (3) increases by at most a constant each time Me receives attention.








|k · a j − bi|
]
where the a j ’s are the elements of A. Recall that B  A · k by assumption, so by continuity  is non-zero. We claim:
• k(p) ·mi  si for all i  n, and
• k(p) ·mi  si −  for at least one such i.
We obtain from this claim the following bound for the numerator:






si = s − . (5)
Combining our observations on the numerator and denominator (4), (5) with (3), we see that
k(q) k(p) + 
Me(X  p) + c . (6)
The ﬁrst part of the claim follows by inspecting each of the cases in (1). If Me and S predict opposite outcomes or Me
bets 0, the result is immediate because X hurts Me while helping S at the same time. If P (p + i) fails, then X helps both S
and Me at this position and in particular k(p) ·mi  si . If on the other hand P (p + i) is true, then X hurts both S and Me
at this position, and in particular k(p) ·mi  si because mi and si are both negative.
It remains to establish the second part of the claim. Appealing to our original hypothesis, we ﬁnd that B is not a subset
of A ·k(p). Since S cycles through all possible bets for B over the n positions p, p+ 1, . . . , p+n− 1, there exists some r  n
such that k(p) ·mr  sr −  .
Let p0, p1, p2, . . . be the positions where Me receives attention, with p0 large enough that no lesser index than e ever
requires attention again and S j has been satisﬁed for all j < e. These positions exist by induction on the following argument.





Me(X  p0) + c · i 







It follows that either:
• For all suﬃciently large r, k(pr) satisﬁes the desired inequality (2),
• or else Me stops betting at some stage.
Either way, Me does not succeed on X .
Since each M j ( j  e) eventually stops betting, there is some stage at which point Se becomes satisﬁed (if it was not
already) because the algorithm chooses an index to focus on according to case 1. Hence S succeeds. 
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a real-world “online” environment, however, a casino may force gamblers to place their wagers within a ﬁxed number of
seconds. In this online case, the analogous diagonal sequence X ′ depends only on a list of time-bounded martingales, which
can be effectively enumerated, and therefore X ′ is computable.
Question. Does the theorem above generalize to the case where A and B are inﬁnite?
As a particular instance, does betting with multiples of some minimum value, i.e. the set of integers, have as much
power as gambling with non-zero wagers merely bounded away from zero, i.e. {x ∈ Q: |x| 1} [2]?
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